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Hurst v. Florida’s Ha’p’orth of Tar: The
Need to Revisit Caldwell, Clemons, and
Proffitt
CRAIG TROCINO* AND CHANCE MEYER
In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court held Florida’s
death penalty scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because
judges, rather than juries, found sentencing facts necessary
to impose death. That Sixth Amendment ruling has implications for Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, capital juries must appreciate their responsibility for
death sentencing. Yet, Florida has instructed juries that their
fact-findings merely support sentencing recommendations,
while leaving the ultimate sentencing decision to a judge.
Because Hurst clarifies that the Sixth Amendment requires
juries to find the operative set of facts on which sentences
are actually determined, Florida must revisit whether its
capital juries have felt the full weight of their proper constitutional
role.
Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Clemons v. Mississippi, appellate courts may reweigh sentencing facts and
conduct harmless error analyses after finding an invalid aggravating factor was used at sentencing. Florida has permitted Clemons review on judge-found facts. After Hurst, Florida must revisit whether such review required sentencing
*
Director, Miami Law Innocence Clinic, University of Miami School of Law;
B.A., Indiana University (1990); J.D., Nova Southeastern University (1993).

Assistant Counsel, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region of
Florida; Adjunct Professor, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; J.D., Tulane Law School. Among the cases cited in this article are several
that involve defendants whom the authors have represented
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facts
found
by
juries.
Florida’s pre-Hurst death penalty scheme was held to satisfy the Eighth Amendment in Proffitt v. Florida. That holding relied on the involvement of juries in finding sentencing
facts and automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court.
Hurst makes clear that Florida juries had no involvement in
finding sentencing facts, and appellate review was based on
facts improperly found by judges. Hurst, therefore, requires
that
Florida
revisit
Proffitt.
Repairs to Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
should be made in the immediate aftermath of Hurst, while
the finality of pre-Hurst death sentences already must be disturbed to satisfy the Sixth. In other words, Florida can repair
today at little expense Eighth Amendment problems that may
prove catastrophic tomorrow. And Florida, full as it is of
able sailors, should know not to spoil the ship for a halfpennyworth of tar.
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I. REVISITING CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI: THE TROUBLE WITH
TELLING CAPITAL JURIES THEIR FACTFINDINGS DON’T
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INTRODUCTION
Florida knows how to weather a storm. And so too does Florida’s death penalty. In the summer of 1972, the United States Su-
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preme Court struck down capital sentencing regimes across the nation because they violated the Eighth Amendment by “so wantonly and so freakishly” failing to “respect human dignity.”1 Before
the year was out, Florida called a special legislative session and
became the first state to adopt a new death penalty statute.2
When the time came for the first execution under the new
statute, prison officials were worried that Old Sparky3 might not
work properly.4 The electric chair had not been used in fifteen
years, and there was no execution protocol to follow.5 So they
resolved to give John Arthur Spenkelink6 two shots of whiskey7
1
In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court found that the
manner in which states were imposing the death penalty was cruel and unusual,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). As
Justice Stewart put it, the Eighth Amendment could not tolerate death to be “so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.” See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan’s central concern was that “the State does not respect human
dignity.” See id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2
See MICHAEL MELLO, DEATHWORK: DEFENDING THE CONDEMNED 33
(2002) (“Only five months after the Furman decision, the Florida Legislature met
in special session to consider a new capital punishment statute.”); State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973) (noting Florida Statute § 921.141 became effective
December 8, 1972).
3
“Florida’s electric chair was . . . nicknamed ‘Old Sparky.’” Jones v. State,
701 So. 2d 76, 82 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Shaw
stated, “[L]egend has it that the chair . . . was a home-made affair, fashioned by
inmates on-site from a single oak tree.” Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
4
David Brierton, superintendent of Florida State Prison at the time of John
Arthur Spenkelink’s execution and later the Secretary of the Florida Department
of Corrections, “had two fears - the chair wouldn’t work or the governor would
call five minutes after it was over and say there was a stay.” Associated Press,
Execution to Mark Death Penalty Anniversary, GAINESVILLE SUN, (May 23,
2004,
6:01
AM)
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20040523/LOCAL/205230307.
5
“Florida did not have an executioner. It had not used the electric chair in
15 years. It had no written procedures on how to conduct an execution.” Id.
6
“The first to die when executions resumed in Florida was John Spenkelink. . .” Sydney P. Freedberg, The Story of Old Sparky, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Sept.
25,
1999),
http://www.sptimes.com/92599/news_pf/State/The_story_of_Old_Spar.shtml.
7
“On a spring morning . . . John Spenkelink had two swigs of Jack
Daniels whiskey before being executed in Florida’s electric chair. The whiskey
was a sedative and ‘last meal’ for Spenkelink, 30.” Zaimarie De Guzman,
David Gore’s Execution Will Reflect Modern Changes in Florida’s Death Row
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before strapping him in—small mercies.8 Spenkelink lived through
the first two surges of 2,250 volts before the third finally killed
him.9 And it was thus that—to the sound of frying bacon, broadcast
by a Jacksonville radio station near death row to celebrate the return
of the Chair10—Florida’s capital justice system got back underway.
The days of wanton disrespect for human dignity were past.
Another tempestuous time came in the 1990s, when Florida’s
electric chair protocol caused a series of horrifically botched executions. Witnesses looked on as flames, sparks, and, in one instance, blood erupted from the heads of Jesse Tafero, Pedro Medina, and Allen Lee Davis.11 The repeated spectacles might have
been enough for the public to lose its taste for capital punishment
entirely,12 or a court to hold the electric chair unconstitutionally
Since its Inception, TCPALM (April 11, 2012), http://www.tcpalm.com/news/david-gores-execution-will-reflect-modern-changes-in-floridas-death-row- sinceits-inception-ep-38278-343311752.html.
8
Id. (“Spenkelink was seated and strapped into the three-legged electric
oak chair, known as ‘Old Sparky. . . . His head was shaved and covered in electrically- conductive gel, his mouth covered by a black gag.”).
9
See Freedberg, supra note 6 (“It took three jolts to kill him.”); see also De
Guzman, supra note 7 (“Three surges of 2,250-volt shocks killed him.”).
10
“The day Spenkelink was put to death, a popular Jacksonville disc jockey
aired a recording of sizzling bacon and dedicated it to the doomed killer.”
STEPHEN G. MICHAUD & HUGH AYNESWORTH, THE ONLY LIVING WITNESS:
THE TRUE STORY OF SERIAL SEX KILLER TED BUNDY (1999).
11
“[S]moke and flames [shot] from [the] head” of Jesse Tafero in 1990.
Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 339 (Fla. 2007). “[A] former maker
of electric chairs said the chair’s aging electrodes caused Tafero to be burned
alive.” Freedberg, supra note 6. “[F]lames and smoke again erupted” near the
head of Pedro Medina in 1997. Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 340. “During Davis’
execution on July 8, some witnesses gasped as blood flowed from under his death
mask and soaked his white shirt.” Freedberg, supra note 6.
12
“If executions get gross, the public, otherwise solidly for them, might
begin to get turned off. Even ashamed of them.” Mary Jo Melone, A Switch is
Thrown, and God Speaks, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (July 13, 1999)
http://www.sptimes.com/News/71399/news_pf/TampaBay/A_switch_is-thrown.
Two public polls conducted in 1997 suggested that “Floridians were ready to banish Old Sparky.” Freedberg, supra note 6. However, there was also plenty of evidence to suggest Florida’s appetite for “its time-honored death rituals” was
endless. Id. It had always been a huge plus politically. “During his campaign for
governor in 1986, for example, Tampa Mayor Bob Martinez vowed that if he was
elected, ‘Florida’s electric bill [would] go up.’” Id. And, even after the gruesome
botch of Medina’s execution, Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth saw
Florida’s horror-show executions as a matter to be publically bragged about, not
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cruel and unusual.13 But neither happened. The Florida Legislature
called another special session and adopted a lethal injection protocol.14 With Old Sparky retired, constitutional challenges were
mooted.15 And so Florida’s death penalty endured once again,
bowed yet not broken.
But the Sunshine State is never long without a storm.
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari
in Hurst v. Florida to consider whether Florida’s death penalty
scheme—still roughly the same scheme that Florida hastily re-

humbled by, commenting that “[p]eople who wish to commit murder, they’d better not do it in the state of Florida because we may have a problem with the electric
chair.” Associated Press, Condemned Man’s Mask Bursts Into Flame During Execution,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/26/us/condemned-man-s-mask-bursts-into-flame-during-execution.html. And he was right to believe that support continued. After Medina,
the Legislature voted 36-0 in the Senate and 103-6 in the House to retain the
Chair. Freedberg, supra note 6. The following year, State Senator Ginny
Brown-Waite, who volunteered to watch the Davis execution, said the stain
formed the shape of a cross, which she considered to be a message from God,
indicating that he gave his blessing to Florida’s use of Old Sparky. See Melone,
supra note 12.
13
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Chair on
several occasions. Justice Shaw of the Florida Supreme Court, joined by Chief
Justice Kogan and Justice Anstead, concluded that “[b]ecause of the spate of
malfunctions in this jerry-built and now-dated chair, I find that execution by
electrocution as currently practiced in this state no longer serves a humane
purpose and in fact violates the prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual’ punishment contained in the Florida Constitution.” Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76,
82–83 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). But the court ultimately held 4-7 that “Florida’s electric chair is not cruel or unusual punishment,”
partly based on the inexplicable reasoning that “[t]he record also contains evidence that the electric chair is and has been functioning properly and that the
electrical circuitry is being maintained.” Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413,
415 (Fla. 1999). Justice Shaw took the extraordinary step of inserting color photographs of Davis sitting blood-soaked in the Chair after the execution, with a
purple contorted face. Id. at 444. But the United States Supreme Court, for the
first time, granted certiorari to determine whether the electric chair was unconstitutional. Deborah W. Denno, Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
665, 665 (2000).
14
“In 2000, the Florida Legislature provided for a new method of execution: lethal injection.” Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 341.
15
“The Court ultimately dismissed its certiorari grant in light of the Florida
legislature’s decision to switch to lethal injection.” Denno, supra note 13 at 665.
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fashioned in 1972 in an attempt to comply with the Eighth Amendment—violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges, rather
than juries, to make the critical factual findings which render a
defendant eligible for the death penalty.16 The State, seeing dark
clouds forming on the horizon, made ready to once again head for
the shelter of anti-retroactivity law,17 harmless error law,18 and other
procedural safe harbors19 which, in the past, had protected Florida’s
death penalty from being swept away in the winds of changing law
and policy.
But when the decision in Hurst made landfall on January 12,
2016, it seemed, at first glance, more in the way of a passing
gale than a hurricanic constitutional event. Despite the Roberts
Court’s notorious loquaciousness20—the opinions of its 2009 term
16

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida at i,
Hurst v. Florida, Case No. 14-7505 (Dec. 3, 2014). While Eighth Amendment
implications were part of the issue presented in Hurst and were on the table for
the Court’s consideration, the Court did not expressly address the Eighth Amendment in its ruling.
17
Florida’s retroactivity standard was established in Witt v. State, which limits the retroactive effect of new constitutional rules only to significant “jurisprudential upheavals.” 387 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1980). For instance, when Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985), announced Eighth Amendment requirements for preserving juries’ appreciation for the gravity of their role in capital sentencing, the Florida Supreme Court found “Caldwell did not represent a
change in the law upon which to justify a collateral attack,” Foster v. State, 518
So. 2d 901, 901 (Fla. 1987), so defendants whose cases were already final could
not get the benefit of Caldwell.
18
Even where multiple constitutional infirmities are found in Florida cases,
the Florida Supreme Court will affirm where it concludes the errors are harmless. See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1166 (Fla. 2014) (“The
cumulative effect of multiple harmless errors does not amount to fundamental error . . . .”).
19
There are procedural hurdles to relief in addition to anti-retroactivity and
harmless error analysis. For instance, in federal courts, unconstitutional state
death sentences cannot be overturned if the rule making them unconstitutional
was not “clearly established federal law” at the time the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The phrase ‘clearly established federal law’
refers only to ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” Bates v. Sec’y,
Florida Dep’t of Corrs., 768 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (alteration in original).
20
Regarding the opinions of the Roberts Court, “[s]ome critics say today’s
lengthy opinions aren’t necessarily models of clarity.” Debra Cassens Weiss,
U.S. Supreme Court Sets Record for Longest Opinions Ever, ABA

1124

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

setting a record high median word count at 4,75121—the opinion in
Hurst was a little wee. Hurst breezed in at approximately a light
2,882 words.22 Where was the grand exposition of a Furman v.
Georgia, which reached back into antiquity to examine the English
“progenitors” of American constitutional rules?23 Where was the
guidance and instruction of a Gregg v. Georgia, which described for
states trying to comply with Furman the structure and methodology
of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding that would do so.24 For that
matter, where was the poetry, like Justice Blackmun’s worldweary lament in Callins v. Collins that after each round of freshest
death penalty atrocities “[t]he wheels of justice will churn again”?25
These usual storm conditions were missing.
But, light on reasoning though it might have been, the opinion’s holding was a sharp crack of thunder. After briefly describing
Florida’s death penalty scheme, the Court wrote pointedly, and
without qualification, “We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional.”26 The reasoning in support of that holding was little more
than a basic syllogism: “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury,
not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of

J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/u.s._su
preme_court_sets_record_for_longest_opinions_ever.
21
Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html?_r=0 (“The Roberts court set a record last term, issuing majority opinions with a median length of 4,751 words, according to data collected by two
political scientists, James F. Spriggs II of Washington University in St. Louis
and Ryan C. Black of Michigan State.”)
22
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
23
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 (1972).
24
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
25
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor’s restraint might have had to do with the far-reaching
effects the decision would have. In Furman, Justice Marshall had recognized the
need to be “precise” and “exacting” in drafting a decision “free from any
possibility of error,” where a case involves not only the life of the petitioner but
also “other condemned men and women in this country currently awaiting execution.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
26
Hurst, slip op. at 1.
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death,”27 Florida let judges do that,28 so Florida’s death penalty
scheme was unconstitutional.29
It became clear in the weeks after Hurst that Justice Sotomayor’s
succinctness in drafting the opinion would do nothing to limit its
impact. The winds began to pick up. The Florida Supreme Court
asked for supplemental briefing to address Hurst in a great many
capital cases.30 Amici flocked to the lead case of Lambrix v. State,
in which Mr. Lambrix faced a death warrant setting his execution

27

Id.
Id. “Florida law required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine
whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the
death penalty” after the jury had recommended a sentence of death based on its
own determination as to aggravating circumstances. Id.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., Lowe v. State, No. SC12-263 (Fla. Jan. 14, 2016) (order granting
appellant’s “Motion for Supplemental Briefing in Light of the Decision in Hurst
v. Florida”); Knight v. State, No. SC14-1775 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); State v. Bright, No. SC14-1701 (Fla. Jan. 19,
2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State,
No. 14-7505 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); State v. Dougan, No. SC131826 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016));
Johnson v. State, No. SC14-1175 (Fla. Jan. 29, 2016) (order granting appellant’s
motion requesting to file a supplemental brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 147505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); King v. State, No. SC14-1949 (Fla.
Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst
v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Morris v. State,
No. SC14-1317 (Fla. filed Jan 19, 2016) (order granting appellant’s motion requesting to file a supplemental brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Simmons v. State, No. SC14-2314 (Fla. filed
Jan. 19, 2016) (order granting appellant’s motion requesting to file a supplemental
brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12,
2016)); Wright v. State, No. SC13-1213 (Fla. filed Jan. 29, 2016) (order directing
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505 2016
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Jackson v. State, No. SC13-1232 (Fla. filed
Jan. 29, 2016); Mullens v. State, No. SC13-1824 (Fla. filed Feb. 1, 2016)
(granting appellant’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Addressing
Hurst v. Florida”); Williams v. State, No. SC14-814 (Fla. filed Jan. 29, 2016)
(granting Appellant’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefs in Light of
Hurst v. Florida”).
28
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for February 11, 2016, and had raised a Hurst claim before the decision had come down.31 Trial proceedings were stayed and continued, one trial judge stating that “[w]hen human life hangs in the
balance— a rush to judgment is unwise” and would “result in
the trivialization of the value of human life.”32 The Florida Legislature got about the business of rebuilding, as committees began
debating proposed bills to rewrite Florida’s death statute,33 later culminating in the Governor signing a new death penalty scheme into
law on March 7, 2016.34 Coverage ramped up among the news
media.35 And Lambrix was given a stay of execution, so the Florida
31
Cary Michael Lambrix filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court the day before Hurst issued, arguing the court should stay the
proceedings pending the decision in Hurst. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, 20, Lambrix v. Jones, Case No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed Jan. 11, 2016). Amici
included the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Defender for the
Northern District of Florida. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lambrix v. Jones, No.
SC16-56 (Fla filed Jan. 15, 2016); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties
Union Foundation & Am. Civil Liberties of Fla. in Support of Petitioner Cary
Michael Lambrix, Lambrix v. Jones, No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed Jan. 21, 2016); Brief
of Amicus Curiae, Fla. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers on behalf of Petitioner Lambrix, Lambrix v. Jones, No. SC16-56 (Jan. 22, 2016).
32
Order Granting State’s Motion to Continue at 3, State v. Toledo, Case No.
2013 102888 CFDL (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2016).
33
See Steve Bousquet, Dozens of Florida’s Death Row Inmates Expected
to Challenge Sentences, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:47 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article58519953.html (“The Hurst case is expected to unleash a flood of new appeals and is forcing a conservative, pro-death penalty Legislature to hurriedly
rewrite the law so that executions can resume.”); Lizette Alvarez, Supreme
Court Ruling Has Florida Scrambling to Fix Death Penalty Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/us/supreme-court-rulinghas-florida-scrambling-to-fix-death-penalty-law.html?_r=0 (“In the State Capitol, the Republican-controlled Legislature is debating how best to change Florida’s unorthodox law, with some pushing for a thorough overhaul to blunt
future legal challenges and others vying for an easy fix that would simply address
the court’s narrow ruling.”).
34
See Bousquet, supra note 33.
35
See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Strikes Down Florida’s Death
Penalty
System,
NPR
(Jan.
12,
2016,
4:25
PM)
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/12/462821735/supreme-court-strikes-down-floridasdeath-penalty-system; Raoul Cantero & Mark Schlakman, Lawmakers Must Reform Florida’s Death Penalty, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:57 PM)
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-death-penalty-florida-reform012216-20160121-story.html; Noreen Marcus, Death Row Case May Reveal Life
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Supreme Court could consider Hurst.36 All that was missing was the
usual television images of palm trees laid over in heavy winds.
During the first oral arguments on Hurst in the Florida Supreme Court, the defense’s position boiled down to a simple point:
“‘To execute people in Florida on the basis of a statute that has
been declared unconstitutional is just wrong.’”37 The State believed
that even if it was unfair for future defendants to get the benefit of
Hurst while others, like Mr. Lambrix, were executed under the unconstitutional statute, “[f]inality sometimes has to trump fairness.”38
The justices’ candid comments reflected a sense for Hurst’s magnitude. Justice Lewis said of the court’s prior treatment of the
Hurst issue, “[w]e can be wrong” and “[w]e have to be big
enough to admit it.”39 Justice Pariente was also outspoken, stating
that “[w]e’ve got substantial inequality in Florida” and characterizing Florida’s death penalty as “an outlier, which is a significant
problem.”40

After Hurst, DAILY BUS. REV. (February 2, 2016) http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202748481563/Death-Row-Case-May-Reveal-Life-AfterHurst#ixzz40GFi2E8f (“And conservative legislators must be seeking divine intervention to write a death penalty statute that’s legal yet keeps the execution machinery going.”).
36
See Order Granting Stay, Lambrix v. Jones, Case No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed
Feb. 2, 2016).
37
Steve Bousquet, Florida Supreme Court Blocks Execution of Death Row
Inmate Michael Lambrix, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016, 4:15 PM)
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/florida-supreme-courtconsiders-stay- for-death-row-inmate-cary-michael/2263646 [hereinafter Florida
Supreme Court Blocks Execution] (quoting defense attorney Martin McClain).
38
See Bousquet, supra note 33 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Carol
Dittmar).
As to the fact that Florida is an outlier state in allowing judges to override jury
recommendations for life sentences, Florida’s Solicitor General argued that
judges “do not contravene the jury’s recommendations very often.” S.M., Supreme Skepticism About Florida’s Death Penalty, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14,
2015). http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/10/executions-sunshine-state. In other words, this aberrational feature of Florida’s death
penalty was not a real concern, because even Florida judges did not care for it
enough to use it.
39
Florida Supreme Court Blocks Execution, supra note 37 (quoting Justice
Lewis).
40
Rene
Stutzman,
Execution
Delayed by
State
Justices, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Feb.
3,
2016,
9:51
AM),
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In the following weeks, this whirlwind of action continued.
As we write this article, it still does. It is still uncertain how Florida
will ultimately resolve the many Sixth Amendment questions posed
by Hurst.41 We write from the heart of that storm, and even after
it dissipates there will remain the possibility of courts reconsidering or expanding the decisions reached. Nevertheless, we take
a moment to look past the Sixth, and ahead to the horizon, where
still another storm front approaches from the Eighth. While Hurst
is, by its terms, a Sixth Amendment case describing a Sixth
Amendment error, it has profound implications on the applicability
in Florida of several Eighth Amendment precedents.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
an Eighth Amendment violation where a jury’s “sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death”42 is diminished
by the State. Three years later in Combs v. State, the Florida Supreme Court found Caldwell did not make Florida’s death penalty
scheme unconstitutional for instructing jurors that their fact-findings as to sentencing factors only went to support an advisory, nonbinding sentencing recommendation to the court.43 Hurst now instructs that Florida failed to appreciate “[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not enough”44 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement
that juries, not judges, must find “each fact necessary to impose a
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-florida-death-penaltyarguments-20160202-story.html (quoting Justice Pariente).
41
As described by one Florida circuit court,
Unfortunately, the Hurst opinion left a number of issues undetermined. For example, the opinion failed to address any requirements of unanimity of votes in
the finding of aggravators, standards to be used in making a determination of mitigators, and the requirement (or lack thereof) of unanimity of votes in sentencing
and the finding of aggravators. More importantly, the opinion failed to inculcate
Florida on the issue of retroactive application of this law.
. . . [T]here is no mechanism in place now to “death qualify” a jury. So even at
the earliest of these proceedings, this court (and the lawyers) would be forced
to extrapolate and speculate on the meanings of Hurst and how it can (or cannot)
be incorporated into the existing or new statutes. To compound matters, there is
a strong likelihood now that the Florida Legislature and/or the Florida Supreme
Court will be weighing in on this matter while this case would be underway.
Order Granting State’s Motion to Continue at 2–3, State v. Toledo, Case No.
2013 102888 CFDL (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2016).
42
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985).
43
See Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1988).
44
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
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sentence of death.”45 In light of that finding, the Florida Supreme
Court should reconsider whether under the Eighth Amendment
Florida juries were misinformed as to the requisite importance of
their role in capital sentencing proceedings. Florida juries should
have been made to feel the weight of the huge responsibility that
would come with their fact-findings serving as the critical and operative set of facts on which courts would determine life or death.
Hurst requires that Florida revisit the Caldwell problem.
In Clemons v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court found it
appropriate for an appellate court to reweigh sentencing factors and
conduct harmless error analyses to cure the trial-level constitutional
violation of a death sentence having been based on an invalid aggravating circumstance.46 The Court relied on its prior holdings in
Hildwin v. Florida,47 that “the Sixth Amendment does not require
that a jury specify the aggravating factors that permit the imposition
of capital punishment,” and Spaziano v. Florida,48 that “neither the
Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to have a
jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence.”49 Hurst
explicitly overruled those precedents, stating that “[t]ime and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano and
Hildwin.”50 Given the holding in Hurst that juries must make the
fact-findings necessary for death to be imposed, Florida must revisit whether appellate courts could constitutionally have reweighed sentencing factors and engage in harmless error analyses
based on judge-found facts, without the requisite jury findings.
In Proffitt v. Florida, the Court considered whether Florida’s
statute adopted in response to Furman succeeded in curing Florida’s Eighth Amendment problems.51 The Court’s analysis relied
heavily on the involvement of juries in finding aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the Florida Supreme Court’s automatic review being effectively facilitated by the requirement that
45

Id.

46

See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990).
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (2016).
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746.
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 9.
See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244 (1976).

47
48
49
50
51
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sentencing judges write orders embodying the critical fact-findings
on which that review would take place.52 Hurst revealed that jury
findings were irrelevant to Florida sentencing and appellate review,
because the only findings of record were those of Florida judges.
Hurst requires that Florida revisit Proffitt under Furman.
We urge Florida courts to take it upon themselves to address
these Eighth Amendment issues in the immediate aftermath of
Hurst. Waiting to see what they might amount to years or decades
from now will spoil the ship for a ha’p’orth of tar.53 Given the extensive Sixth Amendment repairs that must be made after Hurst,
it would cost the State less in the way of additional re-sentencings,
post-conviction litigation, disturbing the finality of capital cases,
and judicial resources to patch up around the Eighth today, while
already about the work of restoration. Florida can and should extend
its repairs to Caldwell, Clemons, and Proffitt.54 Avoiding difficult
Eighth Amendment questions and letting violations pile up in case
after case over the coming years will only result in greater damage
to the administration of capital cases if and when the United States
Supreme Court eventually steps in to remedy the situation. Like the
Hurst of the Sixth seems to have sunk the entire ship, tomorrow’s
Hurst of the Eighth might do the same.
We take this lesson from Florida history. After Ring v. Arizona
held in 2002 that the fact-findings giving rise to death eligibility
under Arizona’s capital sentencing statute must be found by juries
rather than judges,55 Florida failed to correct the constitutional
infirmity in its own death penalty scheme by extrapolating how the
underlying constitutional rule of Ring would apply in Florida. The
Florida Supreme Court instead looked at the situation as having
52

See id. at 251.
The proverb “don’t spoil the ship for a ha’p’orth of tar” means that one
should not risk a large failure in order to save a small amount of cost in the short
term. It takes only a ha’p’orth—that is, a halfpennyworth—of tar to repair a small
crack in the hull of a ship. But if that minor expense is not undertaken and that
minor repair made, the problem may worsen, and the entire ship may sink tomorrow.
54
We do not intend to represent that this list of issues exhausts the greater
implications of Hurst. There are many other questions, such as the possible
need for jury findings of intellectual disability to allow for death eligibility
under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), after the ruling in Hurst. Proffit,
Clemons, and Caldwell are simply the subjects we have chosen for review.
55
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002).
53
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created a “Need for Legislative Action,” and requested that the
Florida Legislature “revisit the statute to require some unanimity
in the jury’s recommendations.”56 The Legislature, for its part, declined to act, did not revise the statute, and, in effect, left it to the
Florida Supreme Court to take responsibility for ensuring the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty.. During the stalemate, people were being sentenced and put to death57. It was not until fourteen years later that the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and, in
Hurst, demanded that Florida do what it had failed to..
After Lockett v. Ohio instructed in 1978 that mitigating circumstances could not be limited to a statutory list,58 the Florida Supreme
Court held that, as long as capital defendants had an opportunity to
present anything in mitigation, Florida juries did not need to be instructed that they could consider mitigating circumstances beyond
those listed.59 Nine years later, the U.S. Supreme Court again had
to step in to clarify that juries had to be made aware that they
could consider any mitigating evidence if Lockett’s mandate was to
mean anything.60 In the meantime, people had been sentenced and
put to death.
After Atkins v. Virginia created a categorical prohibition on the
execution of the intellectually disabled in 2002,61 Florida created a
legal fiction to define intellectual disability in a way that was more
exclusive than the clinical reality of the condition.62 This time,
it took twelve years for the U.S. Supreme Court to step in and re-

56

Steele v. State, 921 So. 2d 538, 548-50 (Fla. 2005).
From the time that the Florida Supreme Court called for Legislative action
in the February 2, 2006, revised opinion in State v. Steele, id., to the time that
Hurst invalidated Florida’s death penalty in 2016, there were 32 executions, according to the Florida Department of Corrections. See Execution List: 1976 – present,
Florida
Department
of
Corrections,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html.
58
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
59
See Downs v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1987); Thompson v.
Dugger, 515 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1987).
60
See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
61
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
62
See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007) (finding that under Florida’s statute, an IQ score over 70 could not establish intellectual disability despite
a standard error of measurement accepted and applied by the psychological
community in clinical diagnosis).
57
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quire Florida courts to consider the psychological community’s definition of intellectual disability rather than a contradictory statutory
fiction.63 In the meantime, people were sentenced and put to death.64
In each of these instances, Florida would have been better off
making the tough decisions early and keeping decades-worth of
unconstitutional death sentences from accumulating. The same is
true now.
Florida should not relaunch its death penalty after its Sixth
Amendment restorations, and continue with executions based on
pre-Hurst capital sentencings, without also having made necessary repairs to its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. When the
squall around the Sixth calms, Florida will wake to a red morning
sky and know that the storm is not yet over.65 History teaches that
will be no time for defiance or daring. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has wisely cautioned mariners since the Nineteenth Century,
one should never, in poor weather, “hazard an extraordinary press
of sail.”66
I. REVISITING CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI: THE TROUBLE WITH
TELLING CAPITAL JURIES THEIR FACTFINDINGS DON’T MATTER
One year shy of a century ago, in July of 1917,67 a Florida
prosecutor stood before a capital sentencing jury in a sweltering
Okaloosa County68 courtroom and said the following: “If there is
any error committed in this case, the Supreme Court, over in the
capital of our state, is there to correct it, if any error should be
done.”69 In a sense, the prosecutor was right. The Florida Supreme

63

See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
From the June 20, 2002, decision in Atkins to the May 27, 2014, decision
in Hall, there were 35 executions. See Execution List: 1976 – present, Florida
Department of Corrections, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html.
65
“Red sky in morning, sailor take warning” is an ancient nautical proverb
for weather forecasting. JOHN ROUSMANIERE, MARK SMITH, ANAPOLIS BOOK OF
SEAMANSHIP 135 (4th ed. 2014).
66
The “Colorado”, 91 U.S. 692, 702 (1875) (emphasis removed).
67
See Blackwell v. State, 79 So. 731, 732 (1918) (“on July 2, 1917, the defendants were placed on trial”).
68
See id.
69
Id. at 735 (quoting prosecutors remarks in closing argument).
64
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Court found there was an error, and the Court corrected it.70 But
in a greater sense, the prosecutor was badly mistaken. His statement
was the error.71
The Florida Supreme Court found in Blackwell v. State that
“[t]he purpose and effect of this remark was to suggest to the jury
that they need not be too greatly concerned about the result of their
deliberation.”72 The Court went so far as to hold that when a jury
is “told that in some measure they could disregard their own responsibility,”73 it “can hardly be treated as harmless,” and thus must
be reversed on appeal no matter how the State might try to explain
the problem away.74
Some forty years later in another capital case, Pait v. State,
the Florida Supreme Court made a similar finding as to the following remarks of the prosecutor:
The State of Florida also provides this defendant
with the only right of appeal. The People of the
State have no right to appeal. This is the last time
the People of this State will try this case in this court.
Because whatever you do, the People have no right
of appeal. They are done. This is their day. But he
may have another day; he has an appeal. So those
are the rights that the State of Florida gives to him,
that intangible object.75
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, stating that while “a trial
judge should be given an opportunity to correct such highly prejudicial although sometimes impulsive remarks of prosecuting officials,” some remarks too “deeply implant seeds of prejudice or confusion that even in the absence of a timely objection at the trial
level it becomes the responsibility of this court to point out the

70

See Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959) (describing the error in
Blackwell).
71
See id.
72
Blackwell, 79 So. at 735–36.
73
Pait, 112 So. 2d at 384 (discussing Blackwell, 79 So. at 735).
74
Id. (discussing Blackwell, 79 So. at 735).
75
Id. at 383.
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error and if necessary reverse the conviction.”76 And so even unpreserved errors of this nature required reversal.
Given these longstanding precedents, one would think it came
as no surprise to Florida when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
in the 1985 case of Caldwell v. Mississippi an Eighth Amendment
violation when the State diminishes a jury’s “sense of responsibility
for determining the appropriateness of death.”77 Had this not already
been the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisprudence?
In our view, Blackwell and Pait were Caldwell before Caldwell
was Caldwell.78 Just like in Blackwell and Pait, the prosecutor in
Caldwell “urged the jury not to view itself as determining whether
the defendant would die, because a death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by the State Supreme Court.”79 And, like the
Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that it
is “impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made
by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility
for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests
elsewhere.”80
But the guiding lights of Blackwell and Pait did not prevent the
Eleventh Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court from doing a bit
of meandering through some rough waters, and getting knocked off
course, on their way to reaching a unified interpretation of Caldwell’s applicability to Florida’s death penalty scheme.
The Florida Supreme Court found the wind first. In Pope v.
Wainwright, the court denied a Caldwell challenge to a Florida jury
being instructed that its role was merely advisory because, unlike
with the Mississippi death penalty scheme at issue in Caldwell, “in
Florida it is the trial judge who is the ultimate ‘sentencer,’” and
the jury, “although an integral part of Florida’s capital sentencing

76

Id. at 384.
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985).
78
Indeed, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, cited Blackwell and
Pait as examples of cases where “even before Furman the sort of argument
offered by the prosecutor here was viewed as clearly improper by most state
courts.” Id. at 334 n.5.
79
Id. at 323.
80
Id. at 328–29.
77
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scheme, is merely advisory.”81 The Florida Supreme Court found
“nothing erroneous about informing the jury of the limits of its sentencing responsibility” in order to “relieve some of the anxiety felt
by jurors impaneled in a first-degree murder trial.”82 The notion of
trying to help capital jurors not be too fretful about their task
seemed rather at odds with the underlying sentiments of Caldwell—
that sentencing jurors must “recognize[] the gravity of [their]
task,”83 “view their task as [a] serious one,” and “treat their
power to determine the appropriateness of death as an ‘awesome
responsibility.’”84 One would think that with awesome responsibility comes anxiety. But the Florida Supreme Court found that Florida’s death penalty scheme was Caldwell-compliant “as long as the
significance of [the jury’s] recommendation is adequately
stressed,” which could be accomplished by simply instructing the
jury as to its advisory role under the law.85
A month later, the Eleventh Circuit got underway with Florida’s
Caldwell issue in Adams v. Wainwright, where the judge had instructed the jury
[t]he Court is not bound by your recommendation.
The ultimate responsibility for what this man gets is
not on your shoulders. It’s on my shoulders. You are
merely an advisory group to me in Phase
Two . . . .So that this conscience part of it as to
whether or not you’re going to put the man to death
or not, that is not your decision to make. That’s only
my decision to make and it has to be on my conscience. It cannot be on yours.86
Given this especially enthusiastic judicial effort at anxiety-relief, the Eleventh Circuit reversed under Caldwell because the jury

81

Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 805 (Fla. 1986). The Florida Supreme Court also cited Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), in defense of the
constitutionality of Florida’s system. See id.
82
See id.
83
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985).
84
Id. at 329–30.
85
Pope, 496 So. 2d at 805.
86
Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986).
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was “misled as to the importance of its role.”87 The court seemed to
be on rather a different tack than the Florida Supreme Court, finding that “the jury’s role in the Florida sentencing process is so
crucial that dilution of its sense of responsibility for its recommended sentence” was unconstitutional.88 Unlike the Florida Supreme Court’s endorsement of judges calming the nerves of capital
jurors, the Eleventh Circuit felt that Caldwell prohibited “attempts
to shield the jury from the full weight of its advisory responsibility.”89
Later, in the companion en banc rehearing cases of Mann v.
Dugger90 and Harich v. Dugger,91 the Eleventh Circuit seemed to
all but stall out entirely on its journey to reconciling Florida’s
death penalty scheme with Caldwell. In Harich, the court found
that “the seriousness of the jury’s advisory role was adequately
communicated by the court and prosecutor,” even though the Florida jury had been instructed that “[t]he penalty is for the court to
decide” and “[y]ou are not responsible for the penalty in any way
because of your verdict.”92 This was at odds with Adams.93 And
Mann made things still more chaotic, because the Eleventh Circuit
found a violation of Caldwell in the Florida jury instruction as to
the jury’s advisory role, which had been found constitutional by
the Florida Supreme Court in Pope:
In this case, the comments by the prosecutor were
such that they would mislead or at least confuse
the jury as to the nature of its sentencing responsibility under Florida law. It bears emphasizing that
the prosecutor in Caldwell stated only that the jury’s
verdict would be “automatically reviewable.” Technically, this statement was an accurate statement of
Mississippi law—death sentences are automatically
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi under
87

Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing Ad-

ams).
88
89
90
91
92
93

Adams, 804 F.2d at 1530.
Harich, 844 F.2d at 1473 (describing Adams).
844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988).
844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988).
Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1101 (11th Cir. 1987).
Adams, 804 F.2d at 1526.
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Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105. The mischief was that
the statement, unexplained, would have likely been
misunderstood by the jurors as meaning that their
judgment call on the appropriateness of a death sentence did not really matter. We are faced with a
similar situation here. The prosecutor repeatedly told
the jury that its task was to render an “advisory” recommendation. As with “automatically reviewable”
in Caldwell, this characterization is technically accurate, at least in the sense that the Florida death penalty statute contains the term “advisory.” However,
the danger exists that the jurors, because they were
unaware of the body of law that requires the trial
judge to give weight to the jury recommendation,
were misinformed as to the importance of their
judgment call.94
With the contradictory outcomes in Pope and Mann, it seemed
Florida’s Caldwell jurisprudence was hopelessly unmoored. The
underlying reasoning in Mann was simply impossible to square
with the underlying reasoning in Pope. The Florida Supreme Court
had taken the view that juries were incidental enough to sentencing
that they need not be made too anxious about their involvement. But
the Mann Court believed that, while the Florida Legislature’s
use of the term ‘advisory,’ considered in a vacuum,
could be viewed as evincing a legislative intent that
the sentencing jury play a role which, in the final
analysis, is in fact largely meaningless . . . [W]e
must look to how the Supreme Court of Florida,
the final interpreter of the death penalty statute, has
characterized that role.95
And after surveying various affirmations of the importance of
capital juries at sentencing from the Florida Supreme Court,96 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded in Mann that “the Florida case law
evinces an interpretation of the death penalty statute that requires
94
95
96

Mann, 844 F.2d at 1457.
Id. at 1450.
See id. at 1452–53.
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a trial judge to give great weight to a jury’s sentencing recommendation,”97 and “reflects, we think, an insightful normative judgment
that a jury recommendation of death has an inherently powerful
impact on the trial judge.”98 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the
concerns voiced in Caldwell are triggered when a Florida sentencing jury is misled into believing that its role is unimportant,”99
regardless of what the Florida Supreme Court may have said after
Caldwell about the role of Florida juries in death sentencing.
This led to Combs v. State, where the Florida Supreme
Court remarked that it was “deeply disturbed about the interpretation of Florida’s death penalty process and the application of Caldwell by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in its decisions in Mann v. Dugger . . . .”100 The Florida Supreme Court reasserted its view from Pope, stating that “the Florida
procedure is clearly distinguishable from the Mississippi procedure” in that “[t]he Florida procedure does not empower the jury
with the final sentencing decision.”101
Ultimately, the tempest subsided when, in Romano v. Oklahoma,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that “to establish a Caldwell
violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to
the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by
local law.”102 In the reconciliatory case of Davis v. Singletary,
the Eleventh Circuit overruled Mann and Harich, because the
view that “a prosecutorial or judicial comment or instruction could
constitute Caldwell error even if it was a technically accurate
description under state law of the jury’s actual role in capital
sentencing . . . cannot survive [Romano].”103 In the end, Florida
law was what it was. Juries were so insignificant to capital sentencing that their duty simply could not be deemphasized too much. So
the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit finally got on
the same course. Caldwell was not a problem in Florida.

97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 1453.
Id. at 1454.
Id.
Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 855 (Fla. 1988).
Id. at 856.
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994).
Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997).
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But now, so many years later, Hurst has exposed a different sort
of Caldwell problem in Florida’s death penalty scheme. Under
Florida’s pre-Hurst death penalty statute, a jury made a non-binding sentencing recommendation of death to a trial court based on
findings “[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and
“[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances” but did not specify what aggravating circumstances it had found.104 Because Hurst found that Florida failed to appreciate “[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not
enough”105 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the
fact that Florida juries were instructed that their fact-findings
would only go to support a non- binding recommendation—rather
than creating the critical and operative set of facts on which the court
would determine the punishment—indicates Florida juries have
been misinformed as to their constitutionally required role in capital sentencing proceedings.106
This problem especially implicates the reasons the Caldwell
Court provided to support the Caldwell rule, of which there are
four. Those reasons were described in relation to the prosecutor
in Caldwell having encouraged the jury to think of appellate
judges as ultimately responsible, but they apply with striking parallel to the Hurst problem of juries being encouraged to think of
trial judges as ultimately responsible for finding the facts on which
death would be imposed.
First, the Caldwell Court believed that diminishing the responsibility of a trial-level sentencer by encouraging her to rely on a
future appellate court review effectively deprived the defendant of
the right to a fair sentencing, because “an appellate court, unlike a
capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance.”107 If a proper sentencing did
not happen in the first instance, it would not happen at all.108 The
Caldwell Court felt that appellate courts cannot fill-in for sentencers that fail to appreciate the gravity of their task, due to several

104
105
106
107
108

See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a-b) (effective March 7, 2016).
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
See id.
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
See id.
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limitations at the appellate stage.109 Some limitations were practical: “Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing
determination, few can be gleaned from an appellate record,” and,
even if they could, “most appellate courts review sentencing determinations with a presumption of correctness.”110 Appellate judges
were simply not in the room to see for themselves, and even if they
had imagination enough to put themselves there, they had to defer
to lower court fact-findings in any event. But other limitations were
less practical, more subtle, and put in place by pre-existing Eighth
Amendment precedents:
This inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any argument for consideration of what this
Court has termed “[those] compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.” When we held that a defendant has a
constitutional right to the consideration of such factors, Eddings, supra; Lockett, supra, we clearly envisioned that that consideration would occur among
sentencers who were present to hear the evidence
and arguments and see the witnesses.111
So the Caldwell Court found that appellate-level sentencing
failed to live up to the requirement of individualized and humanized sentencing inherent in the Eighth Amendment. The human
connection cannot be achieved from the higher bench on review
of a cold record. Appellate review is just not the same as sitting in
those sweltering Florida courtrooms with the Blackwells and the
Paits, seeing the face of each witness, and developing over time
an intuition and sense for the truth behind the evidence. Appellate
courts are just too far removed from that essential American sentencing experience.
This Caldwell concern implicates the Hurst problem directly.
Just as jurors are better- suited than appellate judges to determine
sentence, jurors are better-suited than trial judges to find the operative, binding facts on which sentencing will occur. Fact-finding is
109
110
111

See id.
Id. at 330–31.
Id. (citing Woodson et al. v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
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entrusted by the Sixth Amendment to jurors, not trial judges, for the
same reason that Caldwell sought to entrust sentencing to jurors,
and not appellate judges: jurors are more likely to take a humanistic
view of the defendant and see him as a person like themselves.112
Justice Story has explained that the Sixth Amendment right to jury
fact-findings “was designed ‘to guard against a spirit of oppression
and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and ‘was from very early times
insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.’”113 Legal officials, those
given the power of the State to sit in judgment of other citizens
in case after case, are simply more likely to lose touch with the
common man. As explained by a federal district court about federal
sentencing:
A court that mechanically doles out precalculated
sentences on a wholesale basis to categories of faceless defendants fails to do justice. A court that succumbs to apathy, bred by repetition, will cease to
see defendants as individuals, with pasts and potentials, with humanity and promise. “It is a terrible
business to mark a man out for the vengeance of
men,” and “the terrible thing about legal officials . . . is simply that they have gotten used to
it.” Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles
54–55 (BiblioBazar, LLC 2006) (1909). “[T]he
more a man looks at a thing, the less he can see it,”
so that “they do not see the prisoner in the dock;
all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They
do not see the awful court of judgment; they only see
their own workshop.” Id. at 55.114

112

See id.
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (citing JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A
113

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND
STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed. 1873)).
114

United States v. Coughlin, No. 06-020005, 2008 WL 313099 at *7–8
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 1, 2008).
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This is what Hurst is all about: having a lay juror and member
of the community, rather than a legal official, find facts on which
death will be imposed.
The second reason given for the Caldwell rule is that a jury’s
desire to sentence harshly in order to “send a message,” rather than
to sentence in proportion to the crime at hand, “might make a jury
very receptive to a prosecutor’s assurance that it can more freely
‘err because the error may be corrected on appeal.’”115 Here again,
the Hurst problem is front and center. Florida juries that felt their
anxiety about finding sentencing facts relieved by an instruction that
the judge would be ultimately responsible for finding her own facts,
and sentencing based on those, would take less care in ensuring they
did not make a critical error.
The third Caldwell concern is that a juror might get the
impression that only a death sentence will trigger an appeal and
then understand that any decision to ‘delegate’ responsibility for
sentencing can only be effectuated by returning that sentence.”116
This may lead a jury to impose a death sentence “out of a desire to
avoid responsibility for its decision.”117 In the Hurst context, this
concern is profound. A jury that is advised that its fact-finding
would only go to support a non-binding sentencing recommendation might be more inclined to recommend death. This is so because
a death recommendation would call upon the judge to exercise her
sentencing discretion by finding and weighing sentencing factors.
On the other hand, a life recommendation—suggesting a lack of
facts to support a death recommendation—might lead a judge to
accept the insufficiency of the facts needed to open the door to
death in the first place, and thus not even reach the weighing, the
moral judgment, that would take responsibility for the sentence of
the jury. In other words, a jury could conclude that finding facts to
support a death recommendation was the only way to truly put the
ball in the judge’s court.
The fourth Caldwell concern was that
the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for
any ultimate determination of death will rest with
115
116
117

Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Id.
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others presents an intolerable danger that the jury
will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its
role. Indeed, one can easily imagine that in a case
in which the jury is divided on the proper sentence,
the presence of appellate review could effectively
be used as an argument for why those jurors who
are reluctant to invoke the death sentence should
nevertheless give in.118
Indeed, in the Hurst context, a juror might be likely to encourage another to go along with the finding of a particular aggravator
and a recommendation of death, because the judge was going to
supplant the fact-finding and supersede the sentencing decision anyway.
Hurst makes clear that by encouraging jurors to place responsibility for the finding and consideration of sentencing facts on legal
officials rather than themselves, encouraging jurors to be less concerned about making an error because any error would be corrected, encouraging jurors to find facts to support a death recommendation in order to transfer responsibility for the sentence to the
trial judge, and encouraging jurors to pressure each other into going along with finding facts in favor of death because the finding
would not go to support any death sentence ultimately imposed
anyway, Florida violated Caldwell.119
II. REVISITING CLEMONS V. MISSISSIPPI: APPELLATE COURTS CAN’T
REVIEW FACTFINDINGS THAT DON’T EXIST
When a sentencer weighs an invalid aggravating circumstance in arriving at a death sentence, the Eighth Amendment is
violated.120 The Eighth abhors randomness, and “[e]mploying an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process ‘creates the possibility . . . of randomness.’”121 Invalid aggravating circumstances
wrongly “plac[e] a ‘thumb on death’s side of the scale.’”122 The sentencer is led to believe the defendant is more deserving of death
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 333.
See Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).
Id. (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232, 236 (1992)).
Id. (brackets omitted) (alteration added).
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than he really is,123 which seems as wrong a thing as the justice system could possibly do.
But, ever since Chapman v. California, not all constitutional
errors in a criminal trial require reversal.124 And Clemons v. Mississippi allows the use of invalid aggravating circumstances in support of death sentences to be cured during appellate court review.125
In Clemons, the Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld a death
sentence despite finding one of the aggravating circumstances unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright.126 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that “the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state
appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part
on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either
by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by
harmless error review.”127 Thus, for the last quarter-century, the
Florida Supreme Court has had two avenues to affirm death
sentences despite the sentencer’s consideration of invalid aggravating factors: reweighing sentencing factors128 and harmless error
analysis.129
123

See id.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
125
See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 (1990).
126
See id. at 741 (citing Matnard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), as requiring that the aggravating circumstance of “especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel” not be too vaguely defined).
127
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741. This holding extended to so-called weighing
states the holding of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), that, in states where
aggravating circumstances serve to create death eligibility without weighing
against mitigation, “the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance does not
necessarily require an appellate court to vacate a death sentence and remand to
a jury.” Id. at 744–45.
128
The Court in Clemons acknowledged that it had telegraphed this ruling earlier, when in Barclay v. Florida, seven years prior, it had “opined,” id. at 752,
that “[t]here is no reason why the Florida Supreme Court cannot examine the
balance struck by the trial judge and decide that the elimination of improperly
considered aggravating circumstances could not possibly affect the balance.” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983).
129
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit characterized
the ruling in Clemons as being that “state appellate courts in weighing states
may independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and thereby
cure certain errors that might have occurred at the sentencing phase of a trial;
they may act as sentencers.” Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1568 (11th
Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted) (quoting Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633, 642
(11th Cir. 1991) (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring)).
124
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But, in light of Hurst, the ruling in Clemons no longer applies to
appellate review of pre- Hurst Florida death sentences. The Florida
Supreme Court should revisit the question of whether it is proper
for appellate courts to have reweighed aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and conducted harmless error analyses when reviewing Florida death sentences under Clemons.
The reason Clemons held that appellate courts can cure consideration of invalid aggravating circumstances was simple: there was
no reason they should not. The Court said, “[w]e . . . see nothing in
appellate weighing or reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that is at odds with contemporary standards of fairness or that is inherently unreliable and likely to result in arbitrary
imposition of the death sentence.”130 To reach this conclusion, the
Court relied on its prior holdings in Hildwin v. Florida131 and Spaziano v. Florida.132
In Hildwin, the Court had reviewed the question of “whether the
Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the aggravating factors
that permit the imposition of capital punishment in Florida.”133 Under Florida’s death penalty statute, a jury would recommend a death
sentence based on findings “[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,”134 but the jury
would not specify which aggravating circumstances it had found
to support those findings. The jury would merely make a non-binding sentencing recommendation to the court based on non-disclosed
findings of fact.135 The Hildwin Court held that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury specify the aggravating factors that
permit the imposition of capital punishment.”136 And thus for decades it was thought in Florida that juries made proper findings of
individual aggravators somewhere along the way to the finding of
sufficiency, but exactly where was of no concern to the Sixth
130

Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750.
490 U.S. 638 (1989); see Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989)).
132
468 U.S. 447 (1984); see Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)).
133
Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638.
134
See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a-b) (effective March 7, 2016).
135
See Combs, 525 So. 2d at 858.
136
Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640–41.
131
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Amendment. In fact, juries were later prohibited from specifying
which aggravators they had found. In State v. Steele, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that “[i]ndividual jury findings on aggravating
factors would contradict th[e] settled practice” that “the trial court
alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight
of aggravating circumstances.”137
In Spaziano, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the same death
penalty scheme under the Eighth Amendment.138 Spaziano held that
“neither the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any
other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to
have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence.”139
The jury recommendation of death that Hurst would later find “is
not enough”140 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement for
jury fact-finding, was enough in Spaziano to satisfy the Eighth
Amendment requirement that states provide sentencers with sufficient guidance to “rationally distinguish between those individuals
for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is
not.”141
So the Clemons Court decided that, because Hildwin made it unnecessary for juries to find aggravators and Spaziano made it unnecessary for juries to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine sentences, there was no necessary jury finding
standing in the way of appellate courts reconsidering sentences after
striking one or more aggravators.142 After all, there was no oppositional preexisting constitutional principle. Juries were not really
needed.143
But that all changed with Hurst v. Florida. In Hurst, the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly overruled Spaziano and Hildwin, stating
that “[t]ime and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of
Spaziano and Hildwin.”144 This conclusion was inescapable, given
the ruling in Hurst that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not
137

State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005).
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (2016).
139
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990) (discussing Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 449).
140
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
141
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460.
142
See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745–46.
143
Compare Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746, with Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449.
144
Hurst, slip op. at 9.
138
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a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of
death.”145 Hildwin had been wrong. Spaziano had been wrong. And
knowing this, the Florida Supreme Court must now ask whether by
reweighing of sentencing factors or by harmless error analysis an
appellate court may have constitutionally upheld a Florida death
sentence pursuant to Clemons without jury fact-finding. The court
must ask whether, in Florida, Clemons still stands.
After all, it was the Clemons Court that wrote “when state law
creates for a defendant a liberty interest in having a jury make particular findings, speculative appellate findings will not suffice to
protect that entitlement for due process purposes.”146 This concept
should apply with even more force when the Sixth Amendment creates that interest.
The Clemons Court also cautioned that “[n]othing in this opinion
is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are
required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmlesserror analysis when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding.”147 Just because “such procedures are constitutionally permissible,”148 does not mean they are appropriate in every instance.
“In some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that
peculiarities . . . make appellate reweighing or harmless-error
analysis extremely speculative or impossible.”149 Florida’s unique
death penalty scheme—which conflates the Sixth Amendment factfinding with the Eighth Amendment weighing of sentencing factors
and combines them into one step150—is the sort of peculiarity that
makes appellate review too speculative. Florida chose to protect
death sentences by subsuming jury findings into sentencing recommendations and thus hiding them from appellate review. And the

145

Hurst, slip op. at 1.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346
(1980)).
147
Id. at 754.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249 n.14 (11th Cir. 2007)
(referring to Florida’s death penalty scheme as “one in which the legislative narrowing of death-eligible defendants and the individualized sentencing determination are collapsed into a single step and based on an evaluation of the same sentencing factors”).
146
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price of that is not being able to uncover and review those findings
when doing so would serve the same purpose.
1. APPELLATE REWEIGHING OF SENTENCING FACTORS AFTER
HURST
When Clemons permitted appellate courts to reweigh sentencing
factors after striking an aggravator, the Florida Supreme Court demurred. “On several occasions, the Florida Supreme Court has
stated that it does not reweigh evidence when reviewing a death sentence.”151 In Hudson v. State, the same year as Hildwin, the court
pronounced that “[i]t is not within this Court’s province to reweigh
or reevaluate the evidence presented as to aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.”152
This pronouncement has been relied on by the Eleventh Circuit
on federal habeas review to deny challenges to the Florida Supreme
Court’s alleged reweighing of sentencing factors:
We do not read the court’s opinion as undertaking a
reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . .[T]he Florida Supreme Court has
itself said that it does not reweigh evidence when
reviewing a death sentence . . . .Thus, [the defendant]’s arguments regarding the court’s alleged errors
in assigning insufficient weight to the proffered mitigating evidence or for failing to view the evidence
cumulatively are beside the point. The court need
only have answered the question of whether the aggravator would have been found with a proper instruction beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently,
we find no grounds for viewing the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless error analysis as contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.153
In other words, a defendant cannot maintain a habeas challenge to a Florida Supreme Court analysis that seems an awful
151

Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Hudson v.
State, 538 So. 2d 829, 831 (Fla. 1989).
152
Hudson, 538 So. 2d at 831.
153
Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2007).
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lot like a reweighing of sentencing factors, because the Florida
Supreme Court says it does not conduct reweighing.154 Likewise, the
U.S. Supreme Court has taken the Florida Supreme Court at its word
on this point: “We noted in Parker that the Supreme Court of Florida will generally not reweigh evidence independently, and the parties agree that, to this extent at least, our perception of Florida law
was correct.”155 There again, the quality and constitutionality of the
Florida Supreme Court’s reweighing of sentencing factors escapes
federal review.
This would seem to leave harmless error analysis as the only
Clemons option for the Florida Supreme Court to affirm a death
sentence after striking an invalid aggravating circumstance. But
Florida’s death penalty law is no slave to consistency.
While the Eleventh Circuit has declined to scrutinize the Florida
Supreme Court’s reweighing because the Florida Supreme Court
has stated that it does not reweigh, the Eleventh Circuit has also
found that the Florida Supreme Court does conduct reweighing. For
example, in order to uphold a death sentence in Bolender v. Singletary, where the Florida Supreme Court failed to conduct a harmless error analysis, reweighing was the only alternative to reversal:
In this case, the Florida Supreme Court conducted
the type of reweighing called for in Clemons . . . after striking the
two aggravating circumstances . . . .[T]he Florida Supreme Court did not
state that it had reviewed [the defendant]’s case for
harmless error. But the opinion . . . does indicate
that the Florida Supreme Court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the manner
contemplated by Clemons. First, the court determined that “[t]he disparity between [the defendant]’s
death sentences and Macker’s twelve concurrent life
sentences is supported by the facts.” Having evaluated the only aspect of the case that was argued as
mitigation, the court then found that, “[b]ased on
the evidence and testimony at trial, we agree with
the trial court that virtually no reasonable person
154
155

See id.
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527,539–40 (1992) (citations omitted).
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could differ on the sentence.” Finally, the court concluded by comparing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances proved and finding that, on the record before the court, “[i]n the absence of any mitigating circumstance disapproval of two aggravating
factors does not require reversal of the death sentence.” Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court
conducted the proper form of review after it invalidated the use of two aggravating circumstances and
concluded that the balance of the aggravating and
mitigating factors clearly justified the imposition of
the death penalty; it did not err in declining to remand the case for resentencing.156
How can it be that the Florida Supreme Court is found not to
conduct reweighing when doing so would expose its decision to reversal but found indeed to conduct reweighing when not doing so
would require reversal? The Eleventh Circuit offered an explanation
in Bolender:
On several occasions, the Florida Supreme Court has
stated that it does not reweigh evidence when reviewing a death sentence . . . .The Florida Supreme
Court does, however, conduct a proportionality review of the sentence, which “involves comparing the
balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case at hand with the balance in other
cases (not considered by the jury in recommending,
or the trial judge in fashioning, the sentence to be
given) in which the death penalty has been imposed.” To the United States Supreme Court, and despite the Florida Supreme Court’s protestations to
the contrary, this form of analysis may constitute exactly the type of “reweighing” referred to in
Clemons. To cure a constitutional violation in the
trial court under Clemons, therefore, an appellate
court in a weighing state need only reconsider the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
156

Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1568–69 (citations omitted).
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to determine whether the evidence still justifies the
death penalty.157
And there you have it. Because it does not matter what the
Florida Supreme Court thinks it is doing, a federal habeas court
need not be consistent in what it thinks the Florida Supreme Court
is doing from case to case.158 In this way, the Florida Supreme
Court’s self-imposed limitation is easily sidestepped when inconvenient to a desired result.
Thus, reweighing becomes one of the Clemons options of appellate curing of constitutional violations that we must reconsider after
Hurst, both for purposes of Florida Supreme Court analyses and
federal habeas review.
The requisite reweighing is held to a very high standard of quality. As Judge Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit once explained,
“Clemons does not allow reviewing courts to give cursory attention
to a defendant’s sentence after an aggravating factor has been invalidated.”159 Rather, the Eighth Amendment requires “a thorough
analysis of the role an invalid aggravating factor played in the sentencing process.”160 There must be “close appellate scrutiny of the
import and effect of invalid aggravating factors.”161
The trouble is, the U.S. Supreme Court has already found
this sort of close appellate scrutiny to be impossible when it comes
to jury findings supporting Florida death sentences. In Sochor v.
Florida, the defendant argued that Eighth Amendment error occurred when “the sentencer” weighed the aggravating circumstance
of cold, calculated, and premeditated, because the evidence did not
support that aggravator.162 The U.S. Supreme Court found Sochor’s
argument to require three steps:
[T]he first step in his argument being that the coldness factor was “invalid”. . . ; the second step, that
the jury in the instant case “weighed” the coldness
157

Id. at 1568 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See id.
159
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 1992) (Kravitch,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160
Id. (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 223 (1992)).
161
Id. (quoting Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230) (quotations omitted).
162
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 538 (1992).
158
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factor; and the third and last step, that in Florida the
jury is at least a constituent part of “the sentencer”
for Clemons purposes.”163
The Court found that second step—that the jury weighed the
problematic aggravating factor—”fatally flawed.”164 Why? “Because the jury in Florida does not reveal the aggravating factors
on which it relies, we cannot know whether this jury actually relied
on the coldness factor. If it did not, there was no Eighth Amendment violation.”165 So, prior to Hurst and ever since Sochor, Florida
capital defendants could not challenge a jury’s improper weighing
of invalid aggravating factors because that weighing was done in
secret. It was insulated from review because it was not of record.
How elegant, that the very analysis that has enabled the Florida
Supreme Court to supposedly cure unconstitutional death sentences
based on invalid aggravating factors since Sochor in 1992 must now,
after Hurst, prohibit the Florida Supreme Court from doing the
same. Sochor acknowledged that an appellate court cannot know
on what aggravators a jury relied. Since Hurst recognized those
aggravators as underlying the operative, Sixth Amendment- compliant fact-finding on which Florida death sentences must be imposed,
an appellate court could not and cannot act as a fill-in sentencer and
reweigh aggravating circumstances to uphold a pre-Hurst Florida
death sentence. The only underlying facts available on which to
rely were found by a judge. Cases in which Florida death sentences were affirmed based on appellate reweighing of sentencing
factors—and the Florida Supreme Court’s proportionality analyses
treated by the Eleventh Circuit as Clemons reweighing—are irreparably unconstitutional and do not survive Hurst.
2. HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER HURST
In addition to reweighing, Clemons “approved of the use by
state courts of ‘harmless error’ analysis to cure a trial court’s erroneous application of aggravating factors in death penalty cases.”166

163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id.
White, 972 F.2d at 1226–27.
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There are two permissible types of harmless error review.167 First,
appellate courts can determine that the sentence would have been
the same had an invalid aggravating circumstance not been instructed in the first place.168 Second, appellate courts can determine
that the sentence would have been the same had an invalid aggravating circumstance been properly instructed.169 However, the problem with Florida’s aggravating circumstances after Hurst is not
merely that the jury was instructed to find an improper one, or improperly instructed to find a proper one; the problem is that the jury
was instructed not to make any record findings as to individual aggravating circumstances at all.170
This means that pre-Hurst harmless error analyses conducted
by the Florida Supreme Court after striking an aggravator171 suffer
from an Eighth Amendment problem in addition to the Sixth
Amendment problem identified in Hurst: the Florida Supreme
Court could not step in as the sentencer under the Eighth Amendment without having the requisite fact-findings on which to rely
under the Sixth Amendment.
This goes back to Steele, one of the cases that served as the
Florida Supreme Court’s post-Ring gut check as to whether it
would stay committed to its death penalty scheme despite the doubt

167

Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id.
169
Id.
170
See id.
171
There are numerous examples of such cases. In Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d
1, 6 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court struck the aggravator of “heinous,
atrocious, or cruel,” but found the error was harmless “in view of the two other
strong aggravating factors found and relatively weak mitigation.” In Anderson
v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. 2003), the Florida Supreme Court struck the
“avoid arrest and committed in the course of a felony aggravators,” but found the
error was harmless because, given “Anderson would still have three remaining
aggravators: CCP, HAC, and prior violent felony,” there was “no reasonable possibility that Anderson would have received a life sentence.” In Oats v. State, 446
So. 2d 90, 95–96 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court decided it was impossible to “know if the result would have been different” where “the judge
weighed three impermissible aggravating factors, in addition to the three permissible ones,” but remanded for a judge resentencing, rather than requiring
findings by a new jury. In Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1998), the
Florida Supreme Court found “the trial court’s ruling would have been the same
beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the invalid factors.”
168
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cast over it by Ring.172 In Steele, the Florida Supreme Court did not
just hold that Florida juries need not specify what aggravators they
found pursuant to Ring, it held that juries could not specify under
Florida law.173 Florida juries were prohibited from making the operative fact-findings on which sentencing judges would rely.174 And
even in cases like Steele, where a Florida trial court took the hint
from Ring v. Arizona and resolved to have juries specify their
findings of aggravators whether the Florida Supreme Court had
yet required it or not,175 trial judges were nevertheless still directed
by Florida’s death penalty statute to make their own findings of aggravating circumstances, and then to rely on those judge-found facts
to weigh mitigation and arrive at a sentence.176 So the jury’s
underlying findings were inoperative, or supplanted, even when
not kept secret.
This led to the rather dumbfounding conclusion that utter fractionalization and disagreement on Florida juries could serve as legally sound fact-finding as to individual aggravators:
the jury may recommend a sentence of death so long
as a majority concludes that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists. Nothing in the statute, the
standard jury instructions, or the standard verdict
form, however, requires a majority of the jury to
agree on which aggravating circumstances exist. Under the current law, for example, the jury may recommend a sentence of death where four jurors believe that only the “avoiding a lawful arrest” aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(e), while three others
believe that only the “committed for pecuniary gain”
aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(f), because
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Steele v. State, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005).
See id.
174
See id.
175
Id. at 541 (noting that the trial court ruled that it “would submit to the jury
a penalty-phase interrogatory verdict form that would require jurors to specify
each aggravator found and the vote for that aggravator”).
176
See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3).
173
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seven jurors believe that at least one aggravator applies.177
Even an aggravator rejected by eleven jurors could end up partially supporting a death sentence if one juror who voted for death
believed that aggravator was established .178 And perhaps this is
the best way to know there were no jury fact-findings as to individual aggravators in Florida to support harmless error review preHurst: Florida treated a jury’s disagreement as to a fact—which is
the opposite of a finding of fact—as a finding of fact. But still, the
only fact-findings of record were those the judge found and described in her sentencing order. And Hurst revealed those to be constitutionally infirm and unusable to appellate courts.
This means that regardless of the extent to which the Sixth
Amendment rule in Hurst is extended to Florida defendants whose
cases were final before Hurst, and regardless of the manner in which
the Florida Supreme Court might attempt to conduct harmless error
analyses to cure the Sixth Amendment violation found in Hurst,
there is an additional Eighth Amendment problem in pre-Hurst
cases in which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed death sentences
through harmless error review pursuant to Clemons, after striking an
invalid aggravator, in reliance on the remaining judge-found aggravators. This distinction—between harmless error review of the
Hurst problem and pre-Hurst harmless error review under
Clemons—matters, because the Eighth Amendment violation has
different implications than the Sixth Amendment violation.179 The
177

Steele, 921 So. 2d at 545–46.
See id.
179
Hurst was not silent on harmless error, but it also did not offer much guidance. The Court stated “we do not reach the State’s assertion that any error was
harmless,” because “[t]his Court normally leaves it to state courts to consider
whether an error is harmless, and we see no reason to depart from that pattern
here. Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). The Court
did cite Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999), for “holding that the failure
to submit an uncontested element of an offense to a jury may be harmless,” Id. at
10, but did nothing to change its admonishment from Clemons that “nothing in
this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are
required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmless-error analysis. . . .” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990). However, whatever
bearing the Court’s comments as to harmless error might be said to have on
Florida Supreme Court harmless error review of the Hurst Sixth Amendment
178
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first is about the likelihood of a different outcome had the jury made
the critical death-eligibility fact-findings under the Florida statute,
which Hurst identified as being the findings of sufficient aggravators not outweighed by mitigators contained in Florida Statutes
§ 921.141(3).180 The second is about the likelihood of a different
outcome had the jury made fact-findings as to individual aggravators.
Jury death recommendations pre-Hurst embodied the general
finding of sufficient aggravators under Florida Statutes
§ 921.141(2), but not the particular aggravators found. Thus, the
Eighth Amendment problem with the Florida Supreme Court’s preHurst harmless error analyses under Clemons is that an appellate
court cannot achieve the level of reason and soundness required of
a Clemons harmless error analysis while only being able to
speculate about what operative aggravators were actually found.
The standard of scrutiny required of Clemons harmless error analyses is too high.181
An appellate court can only find an error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.182 In Sochor, the U.S. Supreme Court made
clear that a high level of clarity and certainty was required of harmless error analyses when it declined to give the Florida Supreme
Court the benefit of the doubt and “accept an implied harmless error
analysis” in the absence of an explicit rationale.183 The Florida Supreme Court had found insufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance that the crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated, but affirmed on the following analysis:
Even after removing the aggravating factor of cold,
calculated, and premeditated there still remain three

violation, the Hurst Court certainly did not comment on the decision’s bearing
on pre-Hurst harmless error analyses under Clemons.
180
See Hurst, slip op. at 5–6 (“Florida does not require the jury to make the
critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a
judge to find these facts. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).”).
181
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 1992) (Kravitch,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182
Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007).
183
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing
Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991)).
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aggravating factors to be weighed against no mitigating circumstances. Striking one aggravating factor
when there are no mitigating circumstances does not
necessarily require resentencing. Under the circumstances of this case, and in comparison with other
death cases, we find Sochor’s sentence of death proportionate to his crime.184
The U.S. Supreme Court found this analysis to be an inadequate
assessment of whether the error was harmless, “[s]ince the Supreme Court of Florida did not explain or even ‘declare a belief
that’ this error ‘was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.]’”185 But
the Court was clear that it did not intend “to require a particular
formulaic indication by state courts before their review for harmless federal error will pass federal scrutiny.”186 Rather, it was the
lack of a good, sound explanation that was the central problem. So
Clemons harmless error review came into focus in Sochor as being
fundamentally about reason, not magic words.187 Justice O’Connor
reaffirmed this in her concurrence, emphasizing that “[a]n appellate
court’s bald assertion that an error of constitutional dimensions was
‘harmless’ cannot substitute for a principled explanation of how
the court reached that conclusion.”188
Thus, Clemons harmless error review cannot be accomplished
by lip service. And it cannot be accomplished implicitly. Clemons
harmless error review requires a well-reasoned, well-articulated
examination of how a constitutional error played into a sentencing.189 It has to be practically couched in the reality of the trial, not
184

Sochor, 580 So. 2d at 604 (Fla. 1991) (citations omitted).
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1992). Another example of federal review of a Florida Supreme Court harmless error analysis can be found
in Hill v. State, where “the federal district court found that th[e Florida Supreme]
Court may have erred in its harmless error analysis, in violation of
Clemons . . . ,” and remanded, but also stated that the language used by the
Florida Supreme Court “was possibly sufficient under Clemons.” 643 So. 2d
1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted).
186
Sochor, 504 U.S. at 540.
187
See id.
188
Id. at 541 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
189
Note the more that invalid aggravators are relied on by the prosecution,
the more stringent the harmless error review must be. “When the prosecution has
stressed . . . the invalid factor during the sentencing hearing, a reviewing court
185
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whimsical or speculative. And as a result, the ability of an appellate
court to meaningfully reason out a harmless error analysis is at the
heart of whether a harmless error analysis can rightly be undertaken
at all.
Indeed, while the U.S. Supreme Court has found many constitutional errors amenable to harmless error analysis (such as jury instructions containing an erroneous conclusive presumption, or misstating an element of the offense, or containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption, or neglecting the presumption of innocence, or—
as in Clemons—vaguely defining an aggravating circumstance),190
the Court has found that some are not (such as total deprivation of
the right to counsel, trial by a biased judge, and violation of the right
to self-representation). 191 So-called structural errors—those “contain[ing] a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself’”—
cannot be cured through harmless error review,192 because they “infect the entire trial process.”193 Recall that in Blackwell, the Florida
Supreme Court found that when a jury is “told that in some measure they could disregard their own responsibility”194 it “can hardly
be treated as harmless.”195 Such are errors that infect the entire
trial.196
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a deficient reasonable-doubt instruction to ask in “which category the
present error belong[ed].”197 There, a dividing line between the two
categories was drawn:

must justify its finding of harmless error with a ‘detailed explanation based on the
record.’” White, 972 F.2d at 1229 (Kravitch, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753 (1990).
190
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–07 (1991) (surveying constitutional errors amenable to harmless error analysis).
191
See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (surveying errors that
invalidate the result of a criminal trial and cannot be harmless); Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (doing the same).
192
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).
193
Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993)).
194
Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959).
195
Id.
196
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630–31.
197
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
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The question . . . is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have
upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had
upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. Harmlesserror review looks, we have said, to the basis on
which “the jury actually rested its verdict.” The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error. That must be so, because
to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact
rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings
to support that verdict might be—would violate the
jury- trial guarantee.198
Because Hurst makes clear that a “jury’s mere recommendation”
of sentence, implicitly embodying aggravation findings, “is not
enough” to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement that juries
make the findings that open the door to death,199 we know now
that there are no aggravation findings in pre-Hurst Florida death
penalty cases to be reviewed by appellate courts so that they can
satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirement of reliability and nonarbitrariness when pinch-hitting for trial judges as sentencer. Under
Sullivan, it is the actual finding made by the actual jury in each case
that must be analyzed,200 not the finding that an appellate court
might speculate a jury might have made. “The Sixth Amendment
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s
action.”201 The Florida Supreme Court could not, under the Eighth
Amendment, hypothesize what aggravating circumstances a jury
198

Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
200
This is supported by Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion in Clemons,
which criticizes the majority’s reliance on the conclusion from Spaziano “that evidence relevant to the capital sentencing decision can be adequately assessed by
a trial judge who has witnessed the testimony,” because appellate courts, reviewing under Clemons do so “on the basis of a cold record,” without viewing the
evidence first hand. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 765 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
201
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280.
199
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might have found in order to ask if those circumstances would still
have been found had Florida’s statute complied with the Sixth
Amendment.
And the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in its pre-Hurst
Clemons jurisprudence to hold that its harmless error analysis had
to be “based on what the sentencer actually found.”202 It was never
about the judge’s findings as the sentencer. It was, or should have
been, about the jury’s findings all along. And thus, as in Sullivan,
“the question whether the same verdict . . . would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless,” because “[t]here is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error
scrutiny can operate.”203
It might be argued that the constitutional error reviewed in Sullivan is distinguishable from that of Hurst because Sullivan involved a guilty verdict, which is the province of the jury, rather
than a sentencing verdict.204 But the basis for the holding in Hurst
is that “any fact that ‘expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ is an ‘element’
that must be submitted to a jury.”205 Fact-findings relating to aggravators supporting a sentencing verdict are constitutionally indistinguishable from fact-findings of elements supporting a guilty verdict. That’s the whole point of Hurst. So, just as in Sullivan, in
pre-Hurst Florida death cases “there has been no jury verdict
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”206 And, according
to Sullivan, “[d]enial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is certainly an error of the [structural] sort, the jury
guarantee being a ‘basic protectio[n]’ whose precise effects are
unmeasurable.”207 “The deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error.’”208

202

Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994).
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 (emphasis in original).
204
See id. at 281 (explaining that when an appellate court speculates what
a jury might have found the “wrong entity” determines guilt).
205
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
206
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280.
207
Id. at 281 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S 570, 577 (1986)).
208
Id. at 281–82.
203
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Neder v. United States supports this conclusion.209 There, the
U.S. Supreme Court found that a federal district court’s failure to
submit the tax-fraud element of materiality to the jury was curable
by harmless error analysis,210 or, put another way, was not so “intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal.”211 Why? The
omission of an element—failing to submit one of several elements
to the jury—was found merely to prevent a finding on one element
rather than, as in Sullivan, “vitiat[ing] all the jury’s findings.”212
The Neder Court drew a distinction between “the absence of a complete verdict on every element of the offense” and there being no
verdict at all.213 In the case of pre-Hurst harmless error analyses,
there was no verdict at all from the jury on individual aggravators.
While leaving out one element may not render a trial fundamentally
unfair, leaving out all of them surely must.
3. Secondhand sentencing after Hurst
The inability of appellate courts to act as sentencers without
available jury fact-finding circles back to the Caldwell concern that
“an appellate court, unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly illsuited to evaluate the appropriateness of death,”214 because of their
“inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant”215 fails to live up to the humanized sentencing envisioned in
Woodson v. North Carolina,216 Lockett v. Ohio,217 and Eddings
v. Oklahoma.218 Sentencers just need to be in the room in order to
judge the defendant as a human being. There is no Eighth Amendment-compliant sentencing on a cold record barren of fact-findings.
Because there are no constitutionally sound fact-findings of aggravating circumstances on which to conduct Clemons review, either
by reweighing o r b y harmless error analysis, the Florida Supreme Court should—at the very least in considering the Eighth
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

527 U.S. 1 (1999).
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 4.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 10–11 (citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281).
Id. at 12 (quotations omitted).
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
Id.
Woodson et al. v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603–04 (1978).
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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Amendment implications of Hurst—revisit cases where it affirmed
a death sentence after striking one or more aggravating circumstances.
III.

REVISITING PROFFITT V. FLORIDA: THE ARBITRARINESS OF
FLORIDA DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED WITHOUT JURY
FACTFINDINGS
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, Florida embarked on a journey in search of a death penalty
scheme that would somehow “respect human dignity” in the pursuit of taking human life, and thus no longer violate the Eighth
Amendment.219 Florida first set its course by adopting a new death
penalty statute under which
the jury is directed to consider “ [ w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist;
and . . . [b]ased on these considerations, whether the
defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment]
or death.” . . . The jury’s verdict is determined by
majority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sentence is determined by the trial judge . . . .
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances when
he determines the sentence to be imposed on a defendant. The statute requires that if the trial court
imposes a sentence of death, “ it shall set forth in
writing its findings upon which the sentence of death
is based as to the facts:
(a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances exist . . . and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient
[statutory] mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”220

219

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1976) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 921.141(2), (3)) (citations and footnotes omitted).
220
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With this sentencing scheme, Florida put its trust in the sentencing judgment of lone trial judges, and limited jury involvement to
making—by a simple majority vote and without specifying specific
findings as to aggravators or mitigators—a non-binding sentencing
recommendation of life or death.221
A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court considered Proffitt
v. Florida to determine whether Florida had successfully navigated
around the Eighth Amendment barriers erected by Furman.222 The
Proffitt Court declared that “[o]n its face the Florida system [] satisfies the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman,” and thus
held that the Eighth Amendment was satisfied where a trial judge
makes a capital sentencing determination on sentencing facts she
found herself, without ever knowing what facts the jury found.223
The Proffitt Court held Florida’s judicial fact-finding constitutional, notwithstanding its view that “jury sentencing in a capital
case can perform an important societal function.”224 The Court
cited to Witherspoon v. Illinois, where it had earlier described that
function: “a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and
capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—
than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death.”225 In other words, the jury box is where
a society, not the bench, chooses death. Death being a societal
choice is consistent with the Court’s prior view of the Eighth
Amendment that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.”226 Civilized standards are both defined and met when a jury expresses a society’s conscience. Yet, the
Court observed in Proffitt that “it has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”227
This is due to the Court’s view, expressed in Proffitt, that “judicial sentencing should lead. . .to even greater consistency in the im-

221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1976).
Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 252 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois et al., 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
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position . . . of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury.”228 The Proffitt Court cited approvingly the Florida Supreme Court’s similar view, expressed a
year after Furman in State v. Dixon: “a trial judge with experience
in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the case against the standard criminal activity
which can only be developed by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants.”229 When the Proffitt Court found that the
greater experience and knowledge of trial judges would “assure
that the death penalty [ would] not be imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner,”230 consistency won out over society’s conscience. Thus, before getting to the constitutional implications of
Proffitt that result from Hurst finding that juries had been insufficiently relied on in Florida’s death penalty scheme,231 it is worth
taking a moment to consider the Proffitt Court’s conception of
what the jury’s role and impact would be under that scheme. Justices of the Supreme Court endorsing the experiential sagacity of
trial judges over the common man in finding and weighing sentencing factors may seem antithetical to the jury’s role of effectuating
social conscience in sentencing, particularly in light of Justice
Story’s nineteenth century observation, which we noted above, that
the Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-findings “was designed ‘to
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers.’”232 In that light, it seems the law’s highest officials may be
among the least preferred trustees of the conscience of a nation
founded in part on a strong sense of anti-establishmentarianism.
A community’s standards are best preserved not by a judge, but by
a twelve-member cross-section of that community. Indeed, as Justices Breyer and Stevens have observed, “jurors possess an important comparative advantage over judges” because they more accurately reflect “the composition and experiences of the community

228

Id.
Id. at 252 n.10 (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973)).
230
Id. at 253.
231
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
232
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (citing Story, supra note
104, at 540–41).
229
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as a whole.”233 Much more so than judges, jurors “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death.”234
That judges are the best helmsman of capital sentencing is at
odds with scholarship reflecting that “[a] judge who is a prosperous
white Anglo male . . . will have a picture of reality that differs
markedly from the pictures carried around by a large proportion of
the people being judged: women, poor people, or people of another
race, ethnicity, or religion.”235 Additionally,
the problem of judicial bias involves the risk that the
judge will fall into the old pattern of treating those
who are different not as people but as abstractions—
as projected images of his own negative identities.
The idea of sympathetic connection with the negative identity that one is trying to repress is fundamentally contradictory. Acculturated differences thus
threaten the quality of judging, both in the exploration and evaluation of the facts of a case and in the
application and construction of the governing legal
doctrine.236
In other words, judges acculturated differently from those
being judged can lead to arbitrary sentencing,237 rather than judges
being the hallmark of consistency that the Supreme Court contemplated in Proffitt.238
Research reflects that where, as in Florida, trial judges are
elected based on tough-on- crime campaigns, they are more likely
to override a jury’s life recommendation and less likely to preserve
a defendant’s rights: “Between 1972 and early 1992, Florida trial
judges, who face contested elections every six years, imposed death
sentences over 134 jury recommendations of life imprisonment, but
233

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
234
Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois et al., 391 U.S. 510, 519).
235
Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1958
(1988).
236
Id.
237
See id.
238
See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
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overrode only fifty-one death recommendations.”239 Thus, during
those years, a Florida judge was more than 2.6 times as likely to
override a life recommendation than a death recommendation.240
This problem was even recognized by the Florida Supreme Court
when, in In Re McMillan, it removed a trial judge from a case in part
for his campaign that promised to be more pro-prosecution than his
incumbent opponent.241 There are also studies concluding that
judges who override life recommendations and issue death sentences are more likely to commit serious errors in trial.242 Of
course, this is not to say that jurors are free of potential bias.243
Rather, we intend to highlight that undue reliance on judicial experience is not a constitutional panacea for Florida’s death penalty
scheme.
And, to some extent, the Proffitt Court had to recognize this, because it relied heavily on the role of juries to constitutionalize Florida’s death penalty scheme.244 Charles William Proffitt argued “that
it is not possible to make a rational determination whether there are
‘sufficient’ aggravating circumstances that are not outweighed by
the mitigating circumstances.”245 And, in response, the Proffitt
Court looked to the jury box:
While these questions and decisions may be hard,
they require no more line-drawing than is commonly
required of a factfinder in a lawsuit. For example,
239

Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75
B.U. L. REV. 759, 793 (1995); see also Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello,
Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 196, 210–11 (1992).
240
See id.
241
See In re Matthew W. McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2001).
242
See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY
THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT
IT 1 , 156 (2002), http:/www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf;
Keith Swisher, The Modern Movement of Vindicating Violations of Criminal
Defendants’ Rights Through Judicial Discipline, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 255, 272 (2008).
243
See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 827 (2012).
244
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
245
Id. at 257.
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juries have traditionally evaluated the validity of defenses such as insanity or reduced capacity, both of
which involve the same considerations as some of the
above-mentioned mitigating circumstances . . .
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the
various aggravating circumstances to be weighed
against the mitigating ones. As a result, the trial
court’s sentencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances
of each individual homicide and individual defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be imposed.246
Thus, part of the reason that the Proffitt Court found Florida’s
scheme constitutional was that juries were equipped to make the
difficult determinations that were required by the statute and would
serve to guide and channel the sentencing judge’s discretion.247
Properly instructing the jury on how to find sentencing facts was
part of the process through which the jury would guide judicial
discretion in sentencing.248 So the Court felt justified in relying
on its belief that, given proper instructions, juries are capable of
making tough decisions.249
According to the Proffitt Court, arbitrariness would be eliminated where “the sentencing authority’s discretion is guided and
channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue
in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty . . . .”250 So
even though judges were, in the view of the Proffitt Court, better
at consistently applying the death penalty, juries would still serve
to channel judicial discretion.251
But Hurst changes the entire calculus of Proffitt. In Hurst, the
Court considered the same death penalty sentencing scheme that
was considered in Proffitt. Proffitt held the scheme constitutional
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 257–58.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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“on its face”252 because judges are more consistent than juries in
finding and weighing sentencing facts.253 Hurst, however, found the
same scheme to be facially unconstitutional because the “Sixth
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.”254 The Court flatly concluded,
“[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”255
While Hurst was decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, its
holding implicates Eighth Amendment deficiencies in Florida’s
death penalty scheme. Proffitt relied, at least in part, on the jury
fact-findings to channel and guide the discretion of sentencing
judges, even though the jury would make no actual findings of fact
on the record that would go to support the sentence.256 By holding
that only the jury can make findings necessary to impose death,
Hurst declared that Florida juries were not making constitutionally
mandated findings of fact in death penalty cases.257 Since the critical factual findings have not been made, Florida juries have never
appropriately channeled or guided the sentencing authority as described in Proffitt.258
By holding that jury-found facts, rather than judge-found facts,
must anchor Florida death sentences, Hurst eroded one of Proffitt’s
main pillars.259 The Proffitt Court considered jury fact-finding to
serve as a check on the sentencing court by way of the jury’s sentencing recommendation.260 But Hurst makes clear that no such
check was in place.261 The jury fact-finding never made its way
to the judge, the ultimate sentencer. So, in the forty years after
Proffitt, people have been sentenced to death and executed in Florida without jury findings, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and
concomitantly without jury channeling judicial sentencing discre-

252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id. at 253.
Id. at 252.
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
Id.
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
Hurst, slip op. at 1.
See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.
Hurst, slip op. at 1.
See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
Hurst, slip op. at 1.
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tion, in violation of the Eighth. In other words, Florida death sentences for the last forty years have been—contrary to the holding
in Proffitt—unconstitutionally arbitrary.262
And the problem was not entirely unknown. Florida Supreme
Court Justice Pariente, in her dissent from the affirmance of Timothy Hurst’s death sentence in 2014, acknowledged Eighth Amendment problems263 that went unresolved later by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hurst. The Hurst Court specifically mentioned Justice
Pariente’s dissent, noting that “[s]he reiterated her view that ‘Ring
requires any fact that qualifies a capital defendant for a sentence
of death to be found by a jury.’”264 But Justice Pareinte’s dissent
went further than the implications of Ring; it addressed Eighth
Amendment concerns with Florida’s death penalty that the Hurst
Court declined to address:
Finally, I also take this opportunity to note an evolving concern as to the possible Eighth Amendment
implications of Florida’s outlier status, among those
decreasing number of states that still retain the death
penalty, on the issue of jury unanimity in death penalty cases. Except for Florida, every state that imposes the death penalty, as well as the federal system,
requires a unanimous jury verdict as to the finding
of an aggravating circumstance. This means that in
no other state or federal court in the country would
Hurst have been sentenced to death in this case in the
absence of a unanimous jury finding of an aggravating circumstance. Florida is a clear outlier.265
With jury fact-finding that treats aggravators as elements of the
crime of capital murder comes the requirement of unanimity266. And
262

Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252; Hurst, slip op. at 1.
See Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 452 (Fla. 2014) (Pariente, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
264
Hurst, slip op. at 4 ( quoting Hurst, 147 So. 3d at 450 (2014) (Pariente,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
265
Hurst, 147 So. 3d at 451–52 (2014) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis supplied).
266
See Jones v. State, 92 So. 2d 261, 261 (Fla. 1956) (“In this state, the verdict
of the jury must be unanimous.”).
263
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with unanimity comes fewer death sentences and narrowing of capital murder cases down to the worst of the worst.267 Thus, a lack of
jury fact-finding violates n o t o nl y the right to a jury trial, b u t
a l s o the right to a non-arbitrary capital sentencing by unconstitutionally expanding the class of defendants subject to the death penalty.
Beyond jury fact-finding, the Proffit Court relied heavily on the
Florida Supreme Court’s review process to check the sentencing
judge’s discretion.268 The Court noted—perhaps overenthusiastically—that “[t]he statute provides for automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida” and thus “Florida capital-sentencing procedures [] seek to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”269 The Proffitt Court even
took a moment to fawn over the Florida Supreme Court for “undertak[ing] responsibly to perform its function of death sentence
review with a maximum of rationality and consistency.”270
And so, after the Proffitt Court concluded that trial judges are
the most consistent in death sentencing, the Court placed the remainder of its faith in the justices of the Florida Supreme
Court.271 Any risk of a trial judge sentencing in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, in the Proffitt Court’s opinion, was “minimized
by Florida’s appellate review system, under which the evidence of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is reviewed and
reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida ‘to determine independently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is warranted.’”272 The Proffitt Court heralded the Florida Supreme
Court’s vacating of eight out of twenty-one death sentences it had
reviewed at the time Proffitt was decided,273 which the Proffitt
Court took to mean that the Florida Supreme Court was ensuring
267
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (Because the death penalty is
the “most irrevocable of sanctions,” it “should be reserved for a small number of
extreme cases.”); Coddington v. State, 254 P.3d 684, 709 (Okla. 2011) (cases subject to death penalty must be narrowed down to the “‘worst of the worst murderers’“)
268
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242.
269
Id. at 250–53.
270
Id. at 258–59.
271
Id. at 252.
272
Id. at 242 (quoting Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1975)).
273
Id.
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that each sentence was “consistent with other sentences imposed in
similar circumstances.”274
However, the Proffitt Court’s great reliance on Florida Supreme
Court review was premised on the assumption that the review was
based on proper fact-findings:
Since . . . the trial judge must justify the imposition of a death sentence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of each such sentence is
made possible, and the Supreme Court of Florida . . . considers its function to be to “[guarantee]
that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present
in one case will reach a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case . . . . If a
defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review
that case in light of the other decisions and determine
whether or not the punishment is too great.” State
v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (1973).275
The review was only made meaningful by the presence of
written fact-findings. This is critical because the jury’s fact-findings were not of record; only the trial court’s sentencing order describing the judge’s fact-findings was the basis of review. Because
Hurst recognized that the Sixth Amendment made jury fact-findings the only findings upon which death may be imposed, Florida
Supreme Court review of Florida death sentences can only be
proper and meaningful under the Eighth Amendment if it is based
on those jury findings.276 Thus, Hurst revealed that, along with
constitutionally defective trial-level sentencing determinations,
there have been forty years of meaningless and inadequate appellate review in the Florida Supreme Court.277 None of those volumes and volumes worth of proportionality analysis from the Florida Supreme Court— no matter how earnest—could satisfy the
Eighth Amendment.

274
275
276
277

Id.
Id. at 251.
See Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
See id.
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Beyond the lack of jury fact-findings and meaningful appellate
review, in the years since Proffitt, the channeling of judicial discretion achieved by the statutory enumeration of a finite number
of aggravating circumstances has diminished. There must be clear
and objective standards to sufficiently guide and narrow sentencing
discretion.278 However, it has been Florida’s practice over the decades following Proffitt to expand, rather than reduce, the factors
that make the death penalty applicable.279 At the time of Proffitt,
there were a total of eight aggravating circumstances, a fact
which the Proffitt Court cited approvingly: “[t]he sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge, is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine whether
the death penalty shall be imposed.”280 The Court quoted at length
the statutory description for each aggravator.281 In the years after
Proffitt, Florida doubled the list to sixteen.282
278

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197–98 (1976).
Proffiitt, 428 U.S. at 251 (stating there were eight aggravating factors);
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (laying out sixteen factors in the years following Proffitt).
280
Proffiitt, 428 U.S. at 251.
281
In a footnote, the Court stated:
The aggravating circumstances are:
“(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
“(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
“(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
“(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of
a destructive device or bomb.
“(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
“(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
“(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
“(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
282
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) lists the aggravating factors as follows:
(a)The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony
and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony
probation.
279
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Thus, for years there has been double the potential findings
that can place a particular murder into that narrow category of the
“worst of the worst” for which death is an appropriate punishment.283 By doubling the amount of aggravating factors since Proffitt, Florida has ensured that seemingly all manner of homicides will
(b)The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c)The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d)The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated
child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e)The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f)The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g)The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h)The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i)The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
(j)The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the
performance of his or her official duties.
(k)The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official
engaged in the performance of his or her official duties if the motive for the
capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim’s official capacity.
(l)The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
(m)The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced
age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim.
(n)The capital felony was committed by a criminal gang member, as defined in s.
874.03.
(o)The capital felony was committed by a person designated as a sexual predator
pursuant to s. 775.21 or a person previously designated as a sexual predator
who had the sexual predator designation removed.
(p)The capital felony was committed by a person subject to an injunction issued
pursuant to s. 741.30 or s. 784.046, or a foreign protection order accorded full
faith and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, and was committed against the petitioner
who obtained the injunction or protection order or any spouse, child, sibling, or
parent of the petitioner.”
283
Coddington v. State, 254 P.3d 684, 709 (Okla. 2011) (“the death penalty
should be reserved for the ‘worst of the worst murderers’”). The “worst of the
worst” axiom has developed from Gregg’s reference to “the humane feeling that
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be death-eligible. The reader might peruse the list of sixteen and ask
herself what homicide would not include at least one of those characteristics.
Thus, when it came to finding aggravators in Florida, the narrowing, the channeling, a n d the jury involvement were added at
the step where a jury found sufficient aggravators. That was the
moment of narrowing. That was the line that only the worst of the
worst murders were supposed to cross. But, according to Hurst,
that line was never drawn pursuant to the actual, operative findings of aggravating circumstances that went to support death sentences. Worse yet, for decades there has been no jury-ensured, appellate-ensured consistency in Florida death sentencing.
The only consistency in Florida death sentencing since Furman
has been the consistently expanding universe of defendants eligible
to be executed under an unconstitutional scheme.
In reassessing the Eighth Amendment compliance of death
sentences imposed under Florida’s post-Furman death penalty
scheme, it must be considered that the narrowing accomplished by
having a limited list of aggravating factors has broken down along
with that accomplished by jury fact-finding and appellate review.
Each of the three key checks of judicial discretion relied on by the
Proffitt Court have either been proven meaningless or greatly diminished. As a result, there is nothing left of Proffitt.
For forty years, Florida’s death penalty has sailed smoothly
enough under Proffitt’s ensign, with trial judges as the captain.
But Hurst is a sea o f change. Proffitt’s reliance on jury factfinding and appellate review to narrow the discretion of sentencing judges was misplaced. Justice Pariente was correct that
. . . in no other state or federal court in the country
would Hurst have been sentenced to death in this
case in the absence of a unanimous jury finding of
an aggravating circumstance. Florida is a clear outlier. . . .
While questions of public policy regarding Florida’s
capital sentencing statute are left to the Legislature,
this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
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the Sixth and Eighth Amendment implications of
Florida’s outlier status on the lack of jury unanimity,
which threaten to unravel our entire death penalty
scheme, should be of serious concern.284
Expanding on Justice Pariente’s dissent, it can be said that in no
other state or federal court in the country would the 389 people on
Florida’s death row285 have been sentenced to death on nonbinding, bare majority, undisclosed fact-findings. And that makes
Florida’s post-Furman, pre- Hurst death penalty scheme look very
much like a deliberate widening of death eligibility, rather than the
constitutionally required narrowing.286
It may prove to be that the Eighth Amendment problem in Florida’s death penalty scheme went beyond the lack of jury fact-findings in sentencing and also had to do with a lack of jury sentencing. When the Hurst Court overruled Spaziano as inconsistent
with its holding that “a jury, not a judge, [must] find each fact
necessary to impose a sentence of death,”287 it indirectly found jury
sentencing to be constitutionally required in Florida. This is due
to the fact that the Florida Legislature, in drafting Florida’s former
death penalty statute, wrote the Sixth Amendment finding of aggravators and the Eighth Amendment weighing of sentencing factors into a single, indivisible step.288 Under the statute, the fact-finding necessary to impose death was the sentencing calculus. Hurst
identified the requisite findings of sufficient aggravators not outweighed by mitigators—which is the sentencing determination—as
the operative Sixth Amendment fact-finding. In other words, the
Sixth Amendment requirement that juries must do the operative

284

Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 451–52 (2014) (Pariente concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
285
Greg Allen, Florida Supreme Court to Decide Whether Executions Can Go
Forward,
NPR
(Feb.
2,
2016,
4:56
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/02/465188045/florida-supreme-court-to-decidewhether-executions-can-go-forward.
286
See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting A Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1,
5–6 (2006).
287
Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S, Jan. 12, 2016) (emphasis
added).
288
See Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007).
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fact-finding ends up having the effect that juries must do the sentencing. Thus, the Florida Legislature unintentionally merged two
bodies of constitutional law, by contravening both.
Hurst overruled Spaziano’s upholding of Florida’s sentencing
scheme under the Eighth Amendment.289 In Spaziano, the Supreme
Court noted that in the years after Furman it had “emphasized its
pursuit of the ‘twin objectives’ of ‘measured, consistent application
and fairness to the accused.’”290 The Court went on to confidently
state, “nothing in those twin objectives suggests that the sentence
must or should be imposed by a jury.”291 But now that there is
a requirement in Hurst that the death determination be made by a
jury, the entire underpinnings of a jury’s constitutional role in the
“twin objectives” must be reconsidered from an Eighth Amendment perspective.292 “Time and subsequent cases have washed away
the logic”293 of Spaziano’s preferential view of judicial sagacity
over the judgment of the common man affirming the conscience of
the larger society.294
The manner in which time washed away the logic of prior precedent is reflected in Justice Breyer’s evolution on the issue of
whether the Eighth Amendment requires a jury determination of the
death penalty. In his concurrence in Ring, he stated “[a]lthough I
joined the majority in Harris v. Alabama, I have come to agree
with the dissenting view”295 and declared “I therefore conclude
that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge,
make the decision to sentence a defendant to death.”296 Justice

289

Hurst, slip op. at 1.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110–11 (1982)).
291
Id. at 460.
292
Id.
293
Hurst, slip op. at 9.
294
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
295
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Gregg v Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.)).
296
Id. Summing up his evolution and enlightenment on the subject, Justice
Breyer aptly quoted Justice Frankfurter’s statement that “[w]isdom too often
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Id.
(citing Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
290
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Breyer’s position on this may yet prove to be prescient. Where Proffitt celebrated the trial judge’s experiential helmsmanship in sentencing, Hurst hoists the jury’s expression of social conscience
prominently to the masthead.297 Rather than falling prey to what
Emerson termed the “hobgoblin” of “foolish consistency,”298 Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding a jury’s role in
death penalty sentencing would do well to move forward along the
Sixth Amendment course charted by Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst.
Justice Breyer is not alone. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority
opinion in Spaziano that the Court would overrule in Hurst.299
Ten years after he wrote for the Spaziano majority to uphold
Florida’s death penalty scheme, he defied Emerson’s hobgoblin, and
changed course:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with
the machinery of death. For more than 20 years I
have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along
with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural
and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to
concede that the death penalty experiment has
failed.300

297

Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016).
In his essay, Self Reliance, Ralph Waldo Emerson stated,
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen
and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing
to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what
you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in
hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — ‘Ah, so
you shall be sure to be misunderstood.’ — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood?
Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever
took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE 7 (1841).
299
Hurst, slip op. at 9; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449.
300
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
298
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The logic supporting Proffitt and the Eighth Amendment endorsement of judge-based sentencing in the context of Florida’s
former death penalty scheme is being washed out in the same tide
that carried Spaziano and Hildwin.
Four decades of hindsight after Proffitt has not borne any credence to the Supreme Court’s faith of Florida’s death penalty
scheme. While Florida executed ninety-one people since 1979,
twenty-six death-sentenced people were exonerated.301 Thus, for
every 3.5 executions, Florida came within a hair’s breadth of executing a person wrongly convicted.302 This, along with Hurst,
indicates that Proffitt has broken free from its frayed moorings
and should be cast away from its berth in the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
What we have written here certainly does not exhaust Hurst’s
Eighth Amendment consequences. As if from a crack in the hull of
a ship, Hurst’s implications spider-web outward, reaching far and
undermining the integrity of Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in ways yet to be seen. We have chosen here to chase down
a few of the more troubling fracture lines. We have suggested that
they could be repaired for a mere ha’p’orth of tar, compared to the
cost of waiting. Perhaps the courts will do so. But not until the hull
is fully restored will Florida’s death penalty again be seaworthy.

301
Florida has carried out 91 executions since 1979. Death Row, COMM. OFF.,
FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/. Florida has
had 26 exonerations from death sentences, more than any other state. Innocence
and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those- freed-death-row; see also, Tonya Alanez,
Death Penalty in Florida: By the Numbers, S UN S ENTINEL (Jan. 15, 2016,
8:01 AM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-death-penaltyroundup-20160115- story.html.
302
Id. This failure rate is partially a result of forty years of adherence to the
superiority of judicial sentencing in death penalty cases and the complete lack of
jury fact-finding.

